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SECTION 1983
Judge Leon Lazer:

Let me move on to subject number one for today, section
1983.' We are going to have a distinguished personage in our
county, state, and nation moderate that program for us. Many
in the judicial world believe that Judge George Pratt is one of
the leading judicial figures in the country. He is, I think you
should appreciate, a former municipal lawyer. That to me, of
course, means the salt of the earth. He is a graduate of Yale
Law School and a former law clerk to Judge Froessel in the
New York State Court of Appeals. He has served as Village
Attorney of Westbury, Roslyn Harbor, and Brookville, as well
as Special Counsel to the Board of Supervisors of Nassau
County and the towns of Hempstead, North Hempstead, and
Babylon.
Judge Pratt became a district court judge in 1976 and, in
1982, the President exercised a great deal of wisdom in appointing him to the Second Circuit. He also teaches at Hofstra,
St. John's, and here at Touro. So, it is a great pleasure and a
privilege to have with us Judge George Pratt.
Judge George Pratt:

Thank you, Leon. Good morning. The salt of the earth-I
always wondered about that expression. As I recall, Julius
Caesar spread salt over Carthage so that nothing would grow
there for a hundred years. I do not know if that intimates what
I did to municipal law.
If you will look at the program of what is to be offered today, first is the introduction; the second part deals with section
1983 cases. Then the program goes on with the fourth amendment, job discrimination, affirmative action, and first amendment coverage. But they are all section 1983 cases. The whole
show here is encompassed within section 1983.2
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6

I tell my students in the civil rights litigation seminar that I
teach here at Touro each year that the section 1983 remedy
means that you can fight city hall! You might say today's seminar, focusing upon the 1989 Term of the Supreme Court,
shows city hall can fight back, too.
As you know, there are constant struggles going on in the
federal courts regarding the various problems arising under the
federal constitution. Under section 1983, they range from the
basic elements (including state action, what makes up a constitutional claim, and a number of procedural problems with
these lawsuits) all the way up to attorney fee awards and punitive damages. There was a significant punitive damage decision
this Term,3 although we probably will not get to it. In the employment discrimination area, problems concern the use of statistics, the mixed motive problems and impact cases, and affirmative action decrees, as well as the shifting burdens of
proof, which the Supreme Court has created and tampered
with in the past few years.
One cannot help but wonder where the Supreme Court is
going. Do we have a Reagan-appointed Court that is hell-bent
on turning back the clock on civil rights, or is that too simplistic a view of what is happening? As we work through the cases
today, I ask you to think, not only of what the Supreme Court
did in these cases, but think also of what they could have done
but did not do. It may help us to gain some insight on the
current focus of this mass of litigation.
Our first insight will come from Professor Martin Schwartz.
Marty is a professor here at Touro. He graduated from BrookEvery person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within

the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured

in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For
the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.

Id.
3. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct.
2909 (1989).
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lyn Law School and has practiced in this field some twenty
years. He is co-author of the best book in the area, Section
1983 Litigation: Claims, Defenses and Fees.4 It is the only
book on this subject that pierces through the surface of the
cases and seeks to arrive at a constructive theory of what is
happening. I am sure many of you have noticed that he authors a monthly column in the New York Law Journal entitled
"Public Interest Law." That is just a euphemism for section
1983 cases, mostly those from the Supreme Court.
It is well worth reading his collected writings. I do not think
that there is anyone better qualified to speak on the subject
than Professor Schwartz. He is going to focus on those cases
that make up the largest single group of section 1983 litigation: police brutality cases, the so-called excessive force
problem.
Martin Schwartz:
Good morning. Thank you, Judge Pratt. Several of the section 19835 cases that were decided by the Supreme Court deal
with rather fundamental aspects of section 1983 police brutality litigation. They run a rather broad range, including the
constitutional standards that govern the litigation of these
claims, the question of municipal liability based upon inadequate training, and the right to recover attorney's fees. I believe it is rather significant that, in a Term in which the Supreme Court was widely criticized for cutting back on civil
rights, the Supreme Court preserved and perhaps even facilitated the section 1983 remedy for brutality claims.
To be sure, the Court's decisions work important changes in
terms of the day-to-day ground rules as to how these cases will
now be litigated. But, in working these changes, the Court has
preserved the section 1983 remedy, at least for cases of egregious, or hardcore, brutality.
Now, to understand the significance of the changes, let me
briefly give some background. Prior to last Term, the over4. M.

SCHWARTZ

AND FEES

& J.

KIRKLIN. SECTION

1983

LITIGATION: CLAIMS.

(1986 & Supp. 1989).

5. For text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), see supra note 2.

DEFENSES.
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whelming number of section 1983 brutality claims were litigated under a "shocks-the-conscience" substantive due process
test, which first was formulated in 1973 by Judge Friendly in
his well-known opinion, Johnson v. Glick." Under the Friendly
formulation, to determine whether the use of force was conscience-shocking, it was necessary for the trier of fact to balance such factors as the need for the force that was employed,
the extent of the injury that was inflicted, and whether the use
of force was in good faith for legitimate law enforcement purposes or was utilized in a sadistic and malicious fashion.7 This
last inquiry required the trier of fact to make a subjective evaluation. Because of its subjective nature,8 this shocks-the-conscience test has been somewhat troublesome to judges, litigators, and professors of the law. One leading litigator in this
area, John Williams,9 argues that the real question under this
test is whether the use of force is sufficiently egregious or outrageous."0 That may be considered an alternative description of
shocks-the-conscience. Of course, when we think of it that
way-we obviously all have different consciences-we get
shocked differently and we get shocked differently at different
times. The highly subjective nature of this test often makes it
quite difficult to determine whether we are dealing with only a
common law tort as opposed to a constitutional tort. It is not
always easy to tell whether the use of force by a law enforcement officer crosses this very amorphous shocks-the-conscience
border that takes the case into the constitutional realm. Last
Term's decision in Graham v. Connor1 all but bans the
6. 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973).
7. Id. at 1033.

8. See generally M. SCHWARTZ & J. KIRKLIN, supra note 4, § 3.3.
9. John Williams is an attorney with the law firm of Williams & Wise in New
Haven, Connecticut, whose practice focuses principally on section 1983 litigation.
10. When "shocks-the-conscience" was a viable standard, John Williams ex-

plained that, regardless of what test one chooses to apply, "a jury with an unshocked conscience is unlikely to return a plaintiff's verdict. This is the practical
reality which must be emphasized by practitioners both in selecting cases and in
preparing them for trial." Williams, A Practitioner'sGuide to Representing Plaintiffs in Section 1983 Litigation, reprinted in G. PRATT & M. SCHWARTZ, SECTION
1983 CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION AND ATTORNEYS' FEES 1987: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 39, 44 (336 Practising Law Institute). See also infra note 14,
11. 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989).
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shocks-the-conscience test from the world of section 1983 litigation, and, I suppose, we are not going to hear from shocksthe-conscience too often in future section 1983 litigation.
In Graham, the Court held, somewhat broadly, that all
claims of excessive force by governmental officials occurring in
the course of an arrest, an investigatory stop, or, as the Court
said, "other seizure" are now to be evaluated under a fourth
amendment objective reasonableness test rather than under the
substantive due process shocks-the-conscience theory. 2 And,
what has taken place is that the fourth amendment, in the contexts of the arrest, the investigatory search, and other seizures,
turns out to preempt the substantive due process claim. In
these contexts, substantive due process simply is no longer
available.13 The Court was very careful in stressing the objective nature of the test, stating that now, under the fourth
amendment, the constitutional question should be evaluated
from the perspective of a reasonable police officer on the scene.
In evaluating reasonableness, the trier of fact should consider
such factors as the severity of the crime that the suspect was
allegedly involved in, whether the suspect was armed, whether
the suspect presented an immediate threat to the safety of the
officer or to others, and whether the suspect was attempting to
resist arrest.14 The Court also indicated that, in making this
reasonableness evaluation, the evaluation should allow for the
fact that police officers often have to make difficult, split-second determinations on the spot.' 5 The Court explicitly indicated that the police officer's judgment in these situations
should not be easily second-guessed. 16 At the same time, the
Court also stressed that the officer's good or bad intentions now
12. Id. at 1871.
13. See id.

14. Id. at 1871-72. But see Williams, A Practitioner's Guide to Representing
Plaintiffs in Section 1983 Litigation,reprinted in G. PRATT & M. SCHWARTZ. SECTION 1983 CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION AND ATTORNEYS' FEES 1989: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 89, 123 (380 Practising Law Institute) ("Although the 'shocks the
conscience' test is now consigned to the ashbin of history, it remains the everyday
reality of litigation that a judge or jury with an unshocked conscience is unlikely to
return much of a verdict in favor of any plaintiff.").
15. Graham, 109 S. Ct. at 1872.
16. Id.
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are irrelevant in these contexts.17 They simply are not at issue.
We do not care what is in the officer's mind. So, an officer's
bad intentions will not turn an objectively reasonable use of
force into a fourth amendment violation. 18 Conversely, an officer's good intentions would not make an objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional.19
Now, just to map out the whole picture, the Court referred
to its prior decisions and stated that not all claims of excessive
force are to be litigated under a fourth amendment objective
reasonableness standard. 0 The fourth amendment will apply to
the use of force during arrests, investigatory stops, and other
seizures." But, in dealing with a claim by a pretrial detainee,
the Court said that the test is a due process punishment standard; that the use of force amounts to impermissible punishment-punishment not being permissible against a detainee."
At the other extreme, in dealing with the use of force against a
convicted prisoner, the appropriate constitutional standard is
the eighth amendment-cruel and unusual punishment-a
clause which does bring into play the officer's state of mind.23
The Court left open whether the fourth amendment applies after the suspect is arrested: between the moment of arrest and
the time that the suspect is taken into detention. 4
There are two schools of thought on this question in the
lower courts. Some judges have taken the position that the
seizure continues' throughout the detention.2" If that is true, it
means that the way the suspect is handled must be objectively
reasonable throughout the detention period. There are other
circuit court judges who have said that the seizure does not
continue, but ends at the point that the individual is taken into
custody; at that point, the fourth amendment no longer applies,
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1870.
21. Id. at 1871.
22. Id. at 1871 n.10. See M. SCHWARTZ & J. KIRKLIN, supra note 4, § 3.4
(Supp. 1989).
23. Graham, 109 S. Ct. at 1872-73.
24. Id. at 1871 n.10.
25. M. SCHWARTZ & J. KIRKLIN, supra note 4, § 3.3 (Supp. 1989).
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but perhaps the due process clause will continue to have application in this situation. 6
Why the change of approach in Graham? Why has the
Court chosen this fourth amendment objective reasonableness
standard? Well, to some extent, the decision in Graham was
foreshadowed by a decision in 1985, Tennessee v. Garner,27
which had applied the fourth amendment to a claim that
deadly force was used by the police against a fleeing felon. 28
Graham can be seen as a natural outgrowth of Garner. Of
course, that simply raises the question of why the fourth
amendment test was utilized in Garner. I see two reasons for
the Court's shift to the fourth amendment approach. First, intellectually, the fourth amendment is more appealing to the
Court than a substantive due process standard. After all, the
fourth amendment provides textual support for a constitutional
limitation against unreasonable use of force by government;29
it is right there in the language of the Constitution itself. Contrast that to the very notion of substantive due process, which
is a somewhat amorphous notion. It is certainly a judge-created doctrine, and, to some extent, the whole notion of substantive due process is a somewhat embattled notion.
The second reason, and this is somewhat speculative on my
part, is that the Court's movement to the objective standard
represents a hope on the part of the Court that more of these
cases can be resolved at the summary judgment stage, therefore avoiding the necessity for a number of these cases to be
tried. I have seen that theme in other section 1983 cases decided by the Court in recent years. For example, the Court
attempted to make good-faith, qualified immunity an objective
26. Id.
27. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
28. Id. at 7-8.

29. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV provides:
The right of people to be secure in their persons, papers and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6

test.30 But, I think the problem is that it has not worked for the
immunity issue, and it is not likely to work for the Graham
standard. The reason is that, invariably, at the heart of all of
these brutality cases, there is a major controversy between the
parties over what took place. The police officer has one version,
and the individual alleging the section 1983 claim has a completely different version. Since a factual controversy exists,
many cases are forced to trial, regardless of whether you have
a subjective test or an objective test, and, I think, the facts at
issue are going to continue to require trials.
The Court also utilized the fourth amendment in a second
section 1983 case involving the use of force, Brower v. County
of Inyo,31 which is affectionately referred to as the "blind roadblock" case. The police in that case had strategically placed a
roadblock around the bend of the road-strategically placed so
that the motorist, a fleeing suspect, would not be able to see it
as he came around the turn. " And, as he came around the
turn, for good measure, the police officers, who had their patrol
car at the roadblock, focused the lights of the patrol car at the
oncoming driver.3 3 The oncoming driver crashed into the roadblock and was killed instantly. 4
The holding of the Court was that the utilization of the
roadblock under those circumstances constituted a seizure
within the meaning of the fourth amendment, which is to be
evaluated under an objective reasonableness standard.35 Justice
Scalia wrote a rather brief opinion for a unanimous Court that
certainly showed his professorial background because the opinion, especially given its brevity, contained an unusually large
number of hypothetical examples.36 This is what I call Justice
Scalia roaming into hypothetical heaven. But the essential distinction is this-there are two major types of cases. One is the
30. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-16 (1982). See generally M.
SCHWARTZ

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

& J.KIRKLIN, supra note 4, §§ 7.11-7.14 (Supp. 1989).

109 S. Ct. 1378 (1989).
Id. at 1380.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1383.
Id. at 1381-82.
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case where the law enforcement official intentionally selects an
instrumentality to gain physical control over the individual,
and the instrumentality accomplishes that result, which is what
happened in Brower.3 7 In that situation, the fourth amendment
comes into play. The fact that an individual such as Brower
had the opportunity to stop his car at any moment, the Court
says, is of no consequence.38 On the other hand, if the control
over the individual occurs, not by utilization of the instrumentality selected by the government but accidentally-a prime
example is where a police officer is pursuing a fleeing motorist,
and, in the course of the pursuit, the fleeing motorist's car goes
out of control, the fleeing motorist crashes and, indeed, is
stopped-then, in that situation, the individual was not stopped
by the instrumentality selected by the government in its attempt to obtain physical control over the individual.3 Therefore, the fourth amendment does not apply since the individual
was stopped by his own conduct: his own loss of control of his
automobile.4 0
Now, let me move to the question of municipal liability.
Since 1978, when it decided Monell v.Department of Social
Services,41 the Supreme Court has provided little guidance on
the question of what types of municipal policies may give rise
to section 1983 municipal liability. One of the recurring questions has been whether deficient training and supervision could
give rise to municipal liability. The lower court decisions were
in such a state of confusion that some called them a conceptual
disaster area. The courts differed, for example, over whether
negligence, gross negligence, or deliberate indifference would
be sufficient to impose municipal liability." These are, obviously, hard standards to define. One court said, in effect, we
really cannot define them. 43 Another court said that the "dif37. Id. at 1383.
38. Id. at 1380.
39. Id. at 1380-81.

40. M. SCHWARTZ & J.

KIRKLIN,

supra note 4, § 3.4 (Supp. 1989).

41. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
42. See City of Canton v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1204 nn.7-8 (1989).
43. Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1219 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989).
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ference between a fool, a damn fool, and a God-damned fool"44
is the best way to try to distinguish between these standards.
Now, eleven years after Monell, the Court decided City of
Canton v. Harris,45 rendering a unanimous decision !on this issue.46 It is written in a rather matter-of-fact style. I call it the
"no-sweat" decision-you know, everybody was in a state of
confusion for eleven years and now the Supreme Court says
the whole thing was rather obvious all along. Well, what City
of Canton does is to select a rather tough standard for plaintiffs to meet, rejecting a lesser gross negligence standard.47 For
a plaintiff to recover against the municipality based upon a
claim of inadequate training, the plaintiff has to show that the
municipality was deliberately indifferent in the selection of its
training policy.48 Again, the Court said that municipalities
should not be easily second-guessed as to the wisdom of their
training policies. 49 Also, the Court held that the inadequate
training must be very closely linked to the deprivation of the
plaintiff's federally protected rights."0
Although I think that City of Canton does, in fact, establish
a difficult standard for plaintiff recovery, I also think that the
fact that the United States Supreme Court has preserved the
remedy against municipalities is of social importance because
the hope, after all, is this: if municipalities are required to answer for inadequate training, they will shape up their training
programs, which will lead to fewer constitutional violations by
the police.
One municipal liability question that comes up frequently is
the question of when a single decision by a high official is
equivalent to municipal policy. It is very difficult for courts to
44. Stanulonis v. Marzec, 649 F. Supp. 1536, 1543 (D. Conn. 1986) (citations
omitted).
45. 109 S. Ct. 1197 (1989).
46. Id. at 1200. Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy concurred, saying that
"a § 1983 plaintiff pressing a 'failure to train' claim must prove that the lack of
training was the 'cause' of the constitutional injury." Id. at 1207 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
47. 109 S. Ct. at 1206.
48. Id. at 1205.
49. Id.
50. id.
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distinguish between the exercise of discretion on the one hand
and final policy-making decisions on the other. I want to call
your attention to the case of Jett v. Dallas Independent School
District.5 1 There are several important holdings in that case,
but among the holdings are analyses of the function of the trial
judge and jury on this question of whether a high-level official
is a policy-maker and of the dividing up of the functions."2 The
Court said that the trial judge should determine, as a matter of
state law, whether the official was given final policy-making
authority.53 If the judge finds, as a matter of state law, that the
official was given final policy-making authority, it is then for
the jury to determine whether that decision made by the official was the cause of the violation of plaintiff's federal rights."
In addition to the decisions I have mentioned, there are two
non-section 1983 cases that the Court rendered under the federal rules of evidence. One dealt with the admissibility of investigatory reports. I think it is going to be important to section 1983 brutality litigation that, in the Beech Aircraft
Corporationv. Rainey55 decision, the Court held that investigatory reports containing factual findings may be admissible
even if they contain conclusions or opinions." The Court also
held, in Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co.,57 that all felony
convictions could now be utilized to impeach the credibility of
a witness in a civil case. 58 Again, that case is not a section
1983 case, but I think it has obvious direct applications to section 1983 litigation. Due to the factual nature of these claims,
both the plaintiff and the officer involved almost always will be
called upon to testify as to their versions of the encounter. It is
likely that at least some complaining parties will have prior
felony convictions, and, therefore, under Green, plaintiff's testimony will be available for impeachment. By contrast, however,
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

109 S. Ct. 2702 (1989).
Id. at 2723.
Id.
Id.
109 S. Ct. 439 (1988).
Id. at 453.
109 S. Ct. 1981 (1989).
See id. at 1985.
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the officer involved is unlikely to have such prior convictions,
leaving his testimony free from attack, while placing the plaintiff's otherwise valid claim in jeopardy.
There were four important attorney fee decisions last term. I
think three of the holdings have potential importance in brutality litigation.5 9 I will run through them very quickly. The
Court, in Texas State Teachers Association v. Garland Independent School District,0 gave a generous definition to the
term "prevailing party," saying that the prevailing plaintiff has
to succeed only on any significant claim, 61 thus rejecting the
more stringent "central issue" test that had been applied by
the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. 2 In Blanchard v. Bergeron, 3
the Court dealt with the interplay between contingent fee
agreements and the statutory fee award under section 1988,
holding that the fee that counsel is entitled to under a contingent fee agreement is not the maximum fee that may be recovered under the statute.6 4 This is another way of saying that the
defendant's fee liability does not depend on the amount of fees
that are recoverable under the contingency fee agreement. The
defendant's liability may be greater under the statu te, or, for
that matter, it may be less. Finally, in Missouri v. Jenkins,",
the Court held that the fee award may include compensation
for services rendered by paralegals, law clerks, and law graduates. 6 The computations normally would be at market rates,
not at cost, and the Court approved rates at $35 to $50 per
hour. 7
59. The fourth decision came in Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes,
109 S. Ct. 2723 (1989) (allowing district courts to charge Title VII attorney fees
against intervenors when the intervenors' claims were without merit).
60. 109 S. Ct. 1486 (1989).
61. Id. at 1492.
62. Id. at 1491. Under the central issue test, the prevailing party is the "plaintiff
[that] prevailed on the central issue by acquiring the primary relief sought." Id.
(citation omitted).
63. 109 S. Ct. 939 (1989).
64. Id. at 944.
65. 109 S. Ct. 2463 (1989).
66. See id. at 2470.
67. Id. at 2470, 2472.
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Of course, I mentioned the fees last, but certainly not least
for those who litigate section 1983 brutality cases. In one Supreme Court case, the fee award far exceeded the compensatory damages that were recovered. 8 The compensatory damages were around $33,000 and the fee award was $245,000.69 I
think that, from a societal standpoint, the Court does look at
the preservation of the fee remedy as one in the arsenal of
plaintiff's section 1983 remedies. I think that the preservation
of that remedy provides an important incentive to both police
officers and municipalities to confine their conduct to the
Constitution.
Thank you very much.
Judge George Pratt:
Marty, thank you very much. Next, we will go on to Professor Leon Friedman of Hofstra Law School. Leon is a Harvard
Law graduate and is active in the ACLU. He is an outspoken
and clear-thinking authority in this field. He is so good, in fact,
that the Federal Judicial Center hires him to teach federal
judges about constitutional law, civil rights, and civil rights
litigation.
Leon Friedman:
Pete Rose dominated the legal scene in 1989, so I think I'll
point out some batting averages. Over the past few years, the
Supreme Court has run between ten and twenty section 1983
cases each Term. Last Term there were over twenty section
1983 cases. If you break it up in terms of whether the government or the individual won, they are both batting about .500.
It is a little complicated because the question arises of what to
do with cases involving lawyers. Is that the individual winning
or the lawyer? The lawyers went four-for-four last Term. They
won all of their cases, including the counsel fee cases" and,
most important, the case on the question of whether a federal
68. City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 (1986).
69. Id. at 565.

70. See, e.g., Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. School Dist., 109 S.
Ct. 1486 (1989).
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judge can order you to take a case under section 1915 of the
Judiciary Code.7"
A judge may request that you take a civil rights case where
the lawyer or the individual cannot afford it. A judge out in
Iowa requested Mr. Mallard to take such a case, and Mr. Mallard respectfully declined the request. 2 Then the judge said:
You do not understand, I am requesting you to take the case.
Mallard was quite stubborn and apparently had said no once
too often. Mallard requested a mandamus from the Eighth
Circuit to review the judge's order appointing him, and that
case went to the Supreme Court. It was decided five-to-four in
Mallard's favor, a close case in which the Court said a request
is a request. 73 Therefore, you do not have to worry about calls
in the middle of the night about some case that a judge wants
you to handle.
Putting that aside, there were two fourth amendment cases
that were quite significant wins for the individual. If I could be
a little more cynical than Marty Schwartz about why Graham
v. Connor74 came down, I think the Court is translating a lot of
these police brutality cases into fourth amendment terms because they are looking to knock out a lot of procedural due
process cases under Parratt v. Taylor.7 5 At some point, the
Court is going to say that a procedural due process violation
should be heard in state court rather than in federal court,
which is an extension of the Parrattalternate state remedy approach. 76 But, before the Court can do that, it must clear out
the more obvious fourth amendment cases and say that these
71. See Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 109 S. Ct. 1814 (1989).
72. Id. at 1817.
73. Id. at 1823.
74. 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989). For remarks by Professor Schwartz, see supra notes
11-30 and accompanying text.
75. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
76. In Parratt,the Supreme Court ruled that, when a state employee's random
and unauthorized conduct negligently deprives an individual of a protected property

interest, that person will have no cause of action in federal court if the state provides a meaningful post-deprivation remedy. Id. at 535-44. This principle was ex-

tended to intentional random and unauthorized property deprivations in Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
Later Supreme Court case law overruled that part of Parrattpermitting negligent
conduct to implicate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Davidson
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are fourth amendment or substantive due process violations.
Then, when they close the door on procedural due process,
some of the more sympathetic cases already will be inside.
But, that is a cynical view of why the cases end up the way
they do. You have to ask yourself why, if you shoot and kill
somebody, it is a seizure; but, if you hit him so hard that he
cannot walk, that is not a seizure. I thought that either one
was punishment without due process of law. However, the
Court says a seizure is a meaningful interference with your
freedom of movement. 7 If you are shot dead, then you are not
going to move anymore.
Now, a little later on we will hear about the employment
discrimination cases. In that area, the outcome was not a
mixed bag. There were some sixteen cases involving a conflict
between an employer and an employee, and, in those sixteen
cases, there were only two cases in which the employee won.78
So, cases such as Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,7 1 Patterson v., McLean Credit Union,s ° and Jett v. Dallas Independent
School District"' are quite significant in terms of changing the
legal landscape and making it much more difficult for an employee to succeed under Title VII, 2 under age discrimination,83 and under various employee protection laws. 4
Section 1983, as I said, was a mixed bag. Let me go over a
couple of the procedural cases. There were two statute of limitations cases and the Supreme Court, in both of those cases,
found in favor of the claimant. Some states have dual statutes
of limitation. A few years ago, in a case called Wilson v. Garcia,85 the Supreme Court said that the state statute of limitav. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1986); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31

(1986).
77. See Graham, 109 S. Ct. at 1871 n.10.
78. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989); Frazee v. Illinois
Dep't of Employment Sec., 109 S. Ct. 1514 (1989).
79. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
80. 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
81. 109 S.Ct. 2702 (1989).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
83. See id.

84. Id.
85. 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
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tions for personal injury actions is the measure of a section
1983 statute of limitations.86 But, some states, New York included, have, arguably, two relevant statutes of limitations. We
have a very short assault statute of limitations-one year,",
and we have a longer general personal injury statute of limitations-three years.88 What happens if a policeman is accused
of assaulting someone and is sued under section 1983?
In the old days, five years ago or more, courts would look to
the most analogous state statute of limitations, which in most
section 1983 claims is usually the assault statute. That is not
done anymore. Now, courts utilize the general personal injury
statute of limitations.89 And the Supreme Court, nine-to-zero,
found in favor of the longer statute of limitations.
There was also a tolling case out of Michigan.91 A prisoner
was in prison for the period of time that tolls the statute of
limitations.92 Should that apply to a section 1983 case? The
Supreme Court again found that it did. 93 So, pocedurally,
those two cases generally have kept the door open in section
1983 cases.
The three substantive cases about which I want to talk, and
they were all losers from the individual's point of view, are
Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson 94 a prison
case; Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 5 an eleventh amendment case; and, then, the real heartbreaker,
DeShaney, out of Wisconsin.9
First, the prisoner cases. It is hard to win a prison case in
the Supreme Court these days. The only right that the Court
seems to recognize these days is the constitutional right of a
86. Id. at 279-80.
87. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 215 (McKinney 1990).
88. Id. § 214 (McKinney 1990).
89. See Owens v. Okure, 109 S. Ct. 573 (1989).
90. Id. at 574.
91. Hardin v. Straub, 109 S. Ct. 1998 (1989).
92. id. at 1999.
93. Id. at 2003.
94. 109 S. Ct. 1904 (1989).
95. 109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989).
96. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998
(1989).
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prisoner to marry. 7 If a regulation infringes on that right, the
Supreme Court will take a close look at it.
But, in almost every other area, the Court is cutting back on
prisoner rights. In a first amendment case last year,9 8 a prisoner's first amendment rights, as established in Procunier v.
Martinez,99 were overruled.100 The Court now says that prisoners have a first amendment right to send out expressive material. However, there is no first amendment right to receive expressive material. A prison regulation restricting that right is
not subject to strict scrutiny. It is subject to the much looser
rational relationship test of whether the regulation is rationally
related to the need to control prisoners.101 So, the Court split
up correspondence and denigrated the first amendment rights
of prisoners.
Another prisoner case the Court decided was Kentucky De0 dealing with the right
partment of Correctionsv. Thompson,"'
to visitation. The Court applied its "mandatory language"
rule. 0 3 A prisoner has a liberty right to a benefit or to some
sort of freedom only if the regulation has the requisite
mandatory language. 04 For example, if a prisoner accumulates
enough good time credit, he can go to a work camp, or get a
furlough, or get parole under certain conditions. But, unless the
regulation has the requisite mandatory language, the prisoner
does not acquire the liberty interest, and we know that acquiring a liberty interest is desirable because it cannot be taken
away without procedural due process. 0 5
In determining whether there has been a deprivation of procedural due process, the Court has used a two-step approach in
prison cases. First, look at the regulation to see whether the
97. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96 (1987).
98. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 109 S. Ct. 1874 (1989).

99. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
100. Abbott, 109 S. Ct. at 1881.
101. Id.
102. 109 S. Ct. 1904 (1989).

103. Id. at 1910. The Court noted that mandatory language is explicit language
in the regulation that confers upon the prisoner a liberty interest in the consequences flowing from particular conduct. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1910-11.
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benefit to the prisoner is mandatory or within the discretion of
prison officials. If the regulation utilizes the mandatory language, then the liberty interest exists and the court moves to
the second prong to determine whether the prisoner was given
procedural due process in the deprivation of those rights1 00
The Thompson Court held that the Kentucky regulation did
not have the requisite mandatory language. 0 7 Thus, no interest
was negated, and the aggrieved prisoner could not sue in federal court when his "rights" were taken away. 0 8
One of the eleventh amendment cases last Term was Will v.
1 09 This case dealt with
Michigan Department of State Police.
the question of whether an individual could sue the state in
state court under section 1983.110 The eleventh amendment
only applies to the federal judicial power, and Congress can
establish a federal cause of action that must be heard in state
court where the eleventh amendment is inapplicable. 1 Indeed,
the whole eleventh amendment jurisprudence is one of those
areas in which the losers never give up. Practically every one of
the eleventh amendment cases is five-to-four, and Justices
Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens say that our eleventh amendment jurisprudence has been wrong for twenty
years, and they are not going to accept this ridiculous eleventh
amendment jurisprudence-they are waiting for someone to
come along and help them. 1 2
Well, they did not get any help last Term. In Will, it was
decided that, even though the eleventh amendment does not
apply to state courts, our limitations on suing states in federal
106. Id. at 1909-10.
107. Id. at 1910-11.
108. Id.
109. 109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989).
110. Id. at 2305.
111. In Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980), the Court noted in a footnote that
the eleventh amendment does not apply in state court. Id. at 130 n.2; Nevada v.
Hall, 440 U.S. 410, reh'g denied, 441 U.S. 917 (1979). Therefore, a state could be
sued in state court under section 1983. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 10-11
(1980).

112. See, e.g., Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp,, 483 U.S. 468,
469 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S.
234, 247 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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courts-our eleventh amendment jurisprudence-should carry
over into our interpretation of section 1983.113 Therefore, a
state is not a "person" for purposes of section 1983.1" This
case is another historical review, another one of those examinations of what Congress thought when it passed the law in
1871.1" 5 The Court reasoned that Congress thought counties
and cities were persons, but that states were not persons.118
There were four eleventh amendment cases last year so,
from a pedagogical standpoint, it was a terrific eleventh
amendment year. The eleventh amendment says that the federal judicial power shall not extend to a suit between a citizen
and a state 17 and, generally, you cannot sue a state in federal
court. The amendment originally prohibited suits between the
citizen of one state and another state, but that has been inter6 as prohibiting a suit in fedpreted since Hans v. Louisiana"1
eral court between an individual and the individual's own state
as well. So, one cannot sue a state in federal court.
What you can do is sue a state official for injunctive relief.
Under a case called Ex Parte Young," 9 if a state official violates the Constitution, you may sue him because the minute
he acts unconstitutionally, he is acting ultra vires, and he loses
his state sovereign immunity. 120 If he is a sovereign, he can do
no wrong; if he does wrong, he is not a sovereign anymore;
therefore, you can sue him for prospective relief in federal
court, but you cannot sue the state as such.' 21 The theory is
that you want to be sure that you are protecting the state treasury against lawsuits by individuals. 22 So, you can sue an individual state officer for prospective relief if he violates the
Constitution.
113. Will, 109 S. Ct. at 2309.
114. Id. at 2310.
115. Id.
116. Id.at 2311.
117. U.S. CONsT. amend. XI.
118. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
119. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
120. Id. at 159-60.
121. Id. at 168.
122. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1973).
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The Supreme Court also has said that Congress can abrogate eleventh amendment immunity. 12 3 Congress can pass a
law to take away state immunity and make state treasuries
available for lawsuits. Odd to see how they can do that. Initially, the Court said that the fourteenth amendment, which
came later than the eleventh amendment,'124 is so much of an
overruling or modification of the eleventh amendment as was
necessary to implement the fourteenth amendment. 125 So, if
you are enforcing the fourteenth amendment, you can pass a
law that allows you to sue the states. For example, plaintiffs
126
can sue the states under Title VII.
Now, they had a case last year where Congress was abrogating eleventh amendment immunity under the commerce
clause.'2 Commerce clause? I thought that came before the
eleventh amendment. So, the Court said that timing is not an
issue anymore,12 and Congress can abrogate eleventh amendment immunity, relying on the commerce clause or, for that
matter, the copyright clause. 129 Of course, the states can waive
their eleventh amendment rights.' 30 So, there are ways around
it.
The last cases I want to talk about involve the concept of
state action. In National Collegiate Athletic Association v.

Tarkanian,'31 the NCAA ordered the University of Nevada at
Las Vegas to discipline Jerry Tarkanian, the basketball
coach. 132 The University did not want to do it; they were reluctant; but they ordered him suspended, and Tarkanian claimed
123. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
124. The eleventh amendment was adopted in 1798. The fourteenth amendment
was adopted in 1868.
125. Fitzpatrick,427 U.S. at 452-56.
126. Id. at 447-49.
127. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989).
128. See id. at 2282-86.
129. Several courts have intimated that the eleventh amendment can be abro-

gated by the copyright clause. E.g., Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278
(9th Cir. 1979); Johnson v. University of Virginia, 606 F. Supp. 321 (D. Va. 1985).

130. See, e.g., Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Alabama State Docks Dep't, 377 U.S.
184 (1964) (Alabama constructively waived its sovereign immunity to negligence

claims brought by Alabama citizens under the Federal Employer's Liability Act).
131. 109 S.Ct. 454 (1988).
132. Id. at 456.
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a procedural due process violation.133 The question was
whether that constituted state action.13 4 The Supreme Court
said that, in Tarkanian, it was not the government ordering
the private party to do something, it was a private entity, the
NCAA, ordering a state entity to do something it did not want
to do.' 35 Is that state action recognizable under section 1983?
The answer is no; it is not.1 36
But, let me get to the DeShaney case. DeShaney v. Winnebago County137 is, in many ways, both individually and conceptually, the most important section 1983 case of the Term. A
father had custody of his child after a divorce action, and he
was reported for abusing the child.'38 Indeed, the local social
services agency had come in and, at least temporarily, had
taken custody away from the father.'39 The agency was absolutely aware that this man had problems. It was in the file." 0
But, they put the father and the son back together again."'
Shortly thereafter, the father really hurt the child, causing serious brain damage."42 The child is now profoundly retarded
and is expected to be institutionalized for life. 43 Suit was
brought by the child, and by the mother on behalf of the child,
against the social services agency. 44 The Supreme Court, in a
very literal and narrow decision, said that the social services
agency did not do anything wrong." It was the father who
had committed the wrong and, as a general proposition, the
state has no duty to protect one person from physical abuse by
another person unless the state has undertaken the responsibil133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id.
Id. at 457.
Id. at 465.
Id. at 456-57.
109 S. Ct. 998 (1989).
Id. at 1001.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1002.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1007.
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ity.146 The state has no duty to protect A against B, unless
there are some very extraordinary circumstances present.
There is a rule called the "special relationship rule. 1 4 7 For
example, suppose a wife has an order of protection against a
husband-there are a number of such cases, by the way-the
wife calls up the police and says she has an order of protection,
but her husband is there and he is bothering her. She asks the
police to come over and do something, but the police do not
come over. A number of cases say that such a situation would
be cognizable under section 1983.148 The order of protection
obligates the state to take responsibility, come over, and
intervene.
In addition, there are incidents when a child is placed in foster care. That foster parent is, in effect, an arm of the state.
The state has taken the responsibility of protecting the child. It
is their responsibility; they delegated it to a foster parent, but
it is their responsibility.
In the DeShaney case, the Court did not fit the problem into
one of those special categories. Now, I do not have time to go
through all the problems with the Court's approach, so I will
recommend to you the latest issue of the Record of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York.141 In his Cardozo
lecture, Laurence Tribe of Harvard talks about the DeShaney
case, and he makes the point that the state did assume responsibility. 150 When the state sets up a social service agency and
says that this is the exclusive device for protecting children
(and if you, an individual, go out and try to protect the child
by yourself or with some self-help, you are doing something
wrong), then the state has established responsibility. Justice
Blackmun, in his very eloquent dissent to DeShaney, talks
about poor Joshua. Poor Joshua looked to the state for help, all
146. Id.

147. See, e.g., Estate of Bailey v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1985);
Jensen v. Conrad, 570 F. Supp. 91 (D.S.C. 1983), affd, 747 F.2d 185 (4th Cir.
1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1977).
148. See, e.g., Dudosh v. City of Allentown, 629 F. Supp. 849 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
149. Tribe, Law's Geometry and the Curvature of ConstitutionalSpace, 44 REc.
A. B. CITY N.Y. 575-600 (1989).

150. Id. at 580.
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it did was turn its back, and this was the pathetic result." 1
This is a case that really has both serious human and legal
implications.
Thank you very much.
Judge George Pratt:
Leon, I was very interested in your "more cynical" view of
the shift to fourth amendment from substantive due process
and what you said with reference to Parrattv. Taylor'1 2 closing the door on due process cases. Are you so cynical as to
think that perhaps further down the road there will be a complete closing of the door on section 1983 cases on the theory
that the Bill of Rights itself applies to the states only by way of
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment? Parratt
says that, when there is an adequate state remedy, there is no
constitutional violation, at least where the misconduct is unauthorized.153 Can you comment on that? Do you view it quite
that cynically?
Leon Friedman:
I mean that would be an outrage. But, the Court did take a
major Parratt case last Term, Zinermon v. Burch,0 4 dealing
with the issue of whether Parratt v. Taylor only applies to
property deprivations. 55 This is a liberty case and it implicates
all of the situations. Now again, I do not believe that the Justices sit around in a hotel room and conspire to get section
1983 cases out of federal court. But, it seems to me that they
are taking it in two steps: first, get the more outrageous fourth
amendment cases into the fourth amendment area so at least
those will be preserved. If the Court really attempted to get rid
151. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998,
1012-13 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
152. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
153. Id. at 544.

154. Burch v. Apalachee Community Mental Health Servs., 840 F.2d 797 (11 th
Cir. 1988) (en banc), aff'd, Zinermon v. Burch, 110 S. Ct. 975 (1990) (Parratt

doctrine applies to liberty but not to deprivation by officials authorized to provide
process).

155. See id. at 801 ("Parrattdoes not apply to procedural due process violations
when the state is in a position to provide predeprivation process.").
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of those also, then they would not have to take the other step
of putting the cases into the fourth amendment bag.
But, conceptually, you are right. The way the fourth and
first amendment apply to states is through a form of liberty
protection upon which the states cannot infringe without due
process of law under the fourteenth amendment. That is the
problem of Parratt v. Taylor. Where is the logical stopping
point? If there is an alternate state remedy besides due process, then you really are not deprived of a constitutional right
because you have an alternate state remedy.
Question from Panelist Eileen Kaufman:

I have one question to direct to both Professor Schwartz and
Professor Friedman. You both noted that the Term was
marked by some hostility towards civil rights plaintiffs, but
that the Court preserved, somewhat generously, the section
1988156 attorney fees remedy. I wondered whether either of
you would offer any predictions as to whether next Term, or
perhaps two Terms from now, the Supreme Court will apply
the Crawford'57 holding, which, though not a civil rights case,
limited awards of expert fees to the statutory $30 a day
amount.
Martin Schwartz:

When you say that the Court preserved the section 1988
remedy for brutality cases, what you are saying is that the essence of the remedy remains. What the Court's decisions accomplished last Term is a way to deal with the details of that
remedy. And, the details involve shifts backwards and forwards. Sometimes, as you know, we argue the batting average;
sometimes, it is pro-plaintiff and sometimes pro-defendant,
and, to a large extent, that is what has happened with respect
to the fee remedy. I think that, from an overall perspective, the
fee remedy for prevailing plaintiffs remains a meaningful remedy. Certainly, the Court has said, for example, that public
interest groups can recover fees under the same basis as com156. Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
157. Crawford Fitting Co. v. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987).
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pensated attorneys; 15 8 so the heart of the fee remedy remains
intact. That does not mean that, from the civil libertarian
standpoint, there are no decisions that are subject to criticism.
The case dealing with simultaneous negotiation of the merits
and fees' 59 is a highly contentious decision that some would say
is anti-plaintiff. What they will do with the witness issue is
hard to guess. To crystallize the issue, the question is whether
the fee award can include whole compensation for the expenditures made when an expert witness is retained by the plaintiff,
and there is a split on this issue in the lower federal courts. 60 I
think that the legislative history is probably inconclusive, and,
given this split of opinion and inconclusive legislative history, it
is hard for me to guess how that issue will come out when it
does get to the Court. And I do think it is an important issue.
Question from Panelist Gary Shaw:
I have a comment, and then I will ask whether the panel
agrees with it. I want to focus for a moment on the
DeShaney'61 case. I agree with you, Leon, that it is obviously a
heartrending case. The state knew about the child's situation
and yet the Court, as you said, did not fit it into a special relationship or any other exception it might have found. Instead,
the Court came down with the concept that inaction does not
equal state action. My comment is that I think this is an incredibly important case, not only in this area but in other areas
as well. You can already see the Supreme Court referring to
DeShaney in other cases such as Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services,'62 the abortion case from last Term, when determining the issue of whether Missouri could preclude state
hospitals from performing abortions. 63 The Court said yes, be158.
159.
160.
Court
Casey,

Blum v. Stenson, 405 U.S. 886 (1984).
Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986).
See M. SCHWARTZ & J. KIRKLIN. supra note 4, § 21.8 (Supp. 1989). The
recently accepted a case on this issue. See West Virginia Univ. Hosp. v.
885 F.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1294 (1990).

161. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Scrvs.. 109 S. Ct. 988
(1989).
162. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
163. Id. at 3051.
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cause now they simply will not be doing anything-inaction
does not equal state action.""
Leon Friedman:

I agree. I think it really does have a lot of implications because the whole theory of inaction simply avoids a constitutional duty requiring you to do something. The Court is simply
saying that the state has the means to look the other way. And,
I agree, it is one of those things that waits out there. The
Court eventually will start eroding a lot of the other institutional requirements as well. For instance, do they have a duty
to protect people such as foster children or those in an
institution?
Martin Schwartz:

I agree that we have not heard the end of the DeShaneytype case. Because what is left open in DeShaney is the type of
situation where a public official enhances the risk of injury to a
private individual. The majority in DeShaney said that the
public officials did not enhance the risk of injury to the child in
that case.' 6 5 Now, the next realm of cases is going to be: did
the official enhance the private individual's risk of danger of
being injured by somebody else, and does that matter? There
are cases that present these problems. For example, a police
officer makes an arrest and impounds the car, arrests the male
driver, and leaves the female stranded. The female companion
hitches a ride and is assaulted by the generous driver. Did the
police officer in that case enhance the danger of the female
companion?
Judge George Pratt:

That brings us to the end of the section 1983 cases.

164. Id.
165. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998,
1006 (1989).

